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CONSUMER MISTAKES IN THE MORTGAGE
MARKET: CHOOSING UNWISELY VERSUS NOT
SWITCHING WISELY
Yoon-Ho Alex Lee & K. Jeremy Ko*
ABSTRACT
Regulatory proposals for protecting consumers in the mortgage
markets typically focus on making sure dangerous products are eliminated
and consumers make informed product-choice decisions. These are
intended to address consumers’ product-choice mistakes. But there is
another class of mistakes that has received relatively little attention in the
current regulatory debate: consumers’ failure to switch out of their
mortgage products by refinancing in a timely manner. Studies have shown
that once consumers choose mortgage products, they are slow to take
advantage of reduced interest rates by refinancing efficiently. This is
potentially worth several thousand dollars in interest cost savings. Safety
or disclosure regulation can do very little to entice borrowers who are not
constantly looking to maximize welfare. This Article makes three
contributions: first, we rationalize failure-to-switch mistakes, using a
neoclassical model of product search and market obfuscation; second, we
explain why the market is unlikely to correct failure-to-switch mistakes on
its own, based on the lessons we have learned about product-choice
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mistakes; third, we propose a simple solution that could potentially be
effective in addressing sluggish refinancing. Our threshold suggestion is
that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should establish, certify,
and popularize a simple concept or methodology—much like APR—which
conveys the net wealth and risk effects of refinancing to a given product.
By creating a common language for consumers, lenders, and brokers, this
approach can reduce consumers’ information costs, teach them to demand
information in a useful format, combat market obfuscation, and
importantly, encourage several market-based solutions in turn.
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INTRODUCTION
Mortgage products facilitate household debt financing. At any given
moment millions of people are seeking new products, and millions are
already under some obligation to pay back existing debts.
As such, there are two ways of talking about consumers’ welfare in
the context of the mortgage market at any given moment. First, for those
seeking new mortgage products we can ask whether they are making
product-choice decisions wisely and according to reasonable expectations
of their future states. Second, for those with existing mortgage payment
obligations, secured when the interest rate was higher, we can ask whether
they may be foregoing clearly wealth-enhancing refinancing options that
are now available.
Regulation of mortgage products has been a hot topic of discussion
lately, and for good reason.1 The mounting level of household debt and
increased default rates led to the most recent financial crisis.2 The crisis led
to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), culminating with the establishment
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “Bureau”).3 The Bureau
is statutorily tasked to make sure that “the markets for consumer financial
products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.”4 Suggestions
for improving the mortgage market have ranged from more effective
disclosure regulation5 and behaviorally-informed policy choices6—on the
1. For a general case for consumer financial protection, see John Y. Campbell et al.,
Consumer Financial Protection, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 91 (2011) [hereinafter Campbell,
Consumer Financial Protection].
2. See Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion:
Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis, 124 Q. J. ECON. 1449, 1449 (2009)
(explaining that “the sharp rise in U.S. mortgage default rates has led to the most severe
financial crisis since the Great Depression”).
3. For more background on the impetus leading to the financial regulatory reform and
the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, see DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
FinalReport_web.pdf.
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–
203, § 1021 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Exchange: The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer
Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803, 835 (2008) (explaining that new disclosure regulations
“are likely to provide at most ephemeral gains at best to the bottom end of the distribution,
but only at a high price for everyone else”); Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics:
Human Errors and Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (2006) (discussing rational
decision-making in the face of cognitive and emotional impairments).
6. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr et al., Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Regulation,
in IN BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED (N. Retsinas & E.
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softer side—to imposing fiduciary duties on brokers or lenders and
something akin to safety regulation of credit products—on the stronger
side.7
But the discourse to date has focused almost exclusively on having
consumers make wise product-choice decisions.8 This approach would
make sense in a market for non-refundable goods: for example, if you are
buying an MP3 music file, choosing the right product at the right price is
the only dimension of concern. Once you make your purchase, you are
stuck with it and there’s no remedial measure, except not listening to it.
But many mortgage products are refundable—or more accurately,
replaceable. You can refinance and switch to an alternative product, albeit
at a cost.9 Moreover, your existing mortgage obligation becomes
comparatively less desirable as the market’s interest rate declines below the
coupon rate.
As it happens, empirical evidence indicates that a significant segment
of consumers exhibit a sluggish behavior in refinancing in a declining
interest rate environment, even in the absence of any obvious constraints.10
One might say the problem with the mortgage market is not just that the
consumer is not making the right decision at the moment of purchase;
rather, he may not be constantly making right decisions. Consequently, in
furthering its mission of consumer protecting , the Bureau should seek to
ensure that consumers not only choose wisely but also switch wisely.
The central claim in this Article is that consumers’ product-choice
mistakes and failure-to-switch mistakes are heuristically distinct but
economically equivalent. Put differently, as mathematical optimization
problems individual consumers must solve, these two mistakes are different
in nature. By contrast, as economic problems to our society the
government may wish to address, these two are essentially equivalent in the
sense that (i) they share similar underlying causes, (ii) they result in similar
economic effects overall, and (iii) efforts to address them will also bring

Belsky, eds. 2008) (introducing an opt-out mortgage policy).
7. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 1–2 (2008) (using a “physical products analogy to build a case, supported by both
theory and data, for comprehensive safety regulation of consumer credit”).
8. Two notable exceptions are the proposal for automatic refinancing mortgage
products and the proposal for abolishing the requirement for reissuing title insurance in
refinancing, discussed in Part III.
9. The additional cost includes the cost of searching and switching. The switching
cost may also depend on credit terms as well as any fixed cost involved in switching. If a
mortgage product comes with a prepayment penalty during the early years of repayment,
then the cost of switching may be high.
10. See infra Part I. Our discussion in this Article does not pertain to cash-out
refinancing.
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about mostly similar outcomes. This implies, on the one hand, that
solutions intended to address product-choice mistakes are unlikely to be
effective in addressing failure-to-switch mistakes; on the other hand, it also
indicates that, from a policy perspective, it does not make sense to address
one type of mistake but not the other—unless this is a conscious, informed
decision based on a drawing of a line as a matter of degree.
Although sluggish refinancing—or consumers’ failure to switch out of
their given mortgage products—has been documented for some time, the
existing literature has been slow to rationalize it or otherwise suggest
solutions. Our main contribution to the literature is theorizing failure-toswitch mistakes and comparing and contrasting them with product-choice
mistakes. This is the first article—we know of—that rationalizes failureto-switch mistakes using a neoclassical model, and we do so by introducing
a model of product search and market obfuscation. We do not dispute the
possibility that some amount of failure-to-switch can be attributed to
consumer’s inertia or status quo bias, which is now well-documented.
However, based on available evidence, we also believe that consumers’
failures to switch efficiently can be further rationalized by the lack of
transparency in the refinancing market whereby consumers cannot easily
comprehend the wealth and risk consequences of refinancing. Therefore,
unsophisticated consumers facing high search-and-switching costs are, so
to speak, demanding a premium in the form of a sufficient interest rate
decline before searching into given product offers. This in turn results in a
delay in refinancing in a declining interest rate environment.
This Article also provides an in-depth analysis as to why the market
left to its own is unlikely to solve failure-to-switch mistakes. Specifically,
we argue that the set of market failures that accounts for the persistence of
product-choice mistakes can similarly explain the persistence of failure-toswitch mistakes. These include: collective action problems among
lenders, high transaction costs of identifying potential consumers,
ineffective competitor advertising, implicit lender collusion, and the
market’s insufficient incentive to educate borrowers. All of them allow the
market to maintain a positive level of obfuscation. The two categories of
mistakes are therefore simply different manifestations of the same general
phenomenon: for consumers intent on selecting mortgage products,
obfuscation can lead them to choose unwisely; for consumers with no
exogenous need to select mortgage products, obfuscation can force them to
wait too long and thus, to fail to switch wisely. It is in this sense the two
types are causally analogous.
We also discuss possible justifications for the government to address
failure-to-switch mistakes. Failure-to-switch mistakes are, at the end of the
day, errors in judgment among less sophisticated consumers—the same
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demographic as those who as a group are also more likely to make productchoice mistakes. To this extent, both types of mistakes lead to analogous
economic consequences. First, they involve rent extraction by lenders from
and cross-subsidization of sophisticated consumers by unsophisticated
consumers. Second, to the extent that they both involve a group of
consumers who do not fully internalize wealth and risk consequences of
their decisions, there is also an allocative efficiency problem as well. In
turn, regulatory solutions intended to address failure-to-switch mistakes
and product-choice mistakes will also have consequentially similar effects
on the economy. We also discuss how lenders may react in response to
potential regulation addressing failure-to-switch mistakes.
Our analysis leads to some normative policy implications. Although
the government can take several different measures to render refinancing
more efficient, we highlight a measure that, we believe, is the least
intrusive and the most intuitive (and perhaps the most politically viable).
We argue that, as a first step, the Bureau should empower consumers to
search and switch efficiently by establishing, certifying, and popularizing a
standard bottom-line, product-comparison methodology or concept that
conveys the net wealth and risk effects of switching from one mortgage to
another. In much the same way effective disclosure regulation can help
consumers understand the full wealth and risk consequences of signing up
for a particular mortgage product, the product-comparison methodology
should help consumers quickly understand the comparative wealth and risk
consequences of switching from one product to another. We think this can
go a long way in reducing the gap in consumer sophistication. There
should be additional measures to help consumers overcome their status quo
bias or inertia. However, once the Bureau establishes such a methodology
or concept—a common language of sort—as a result of consumers’
demand, the market may introduce a host of innovative measures that
encourage more efficient refinancing.
The rest of the Article is organized as follows. Part I reviews
empirical evidence on consumers’ sluggish refinancing behavior as their
failure to switch wisely. Part II provides a general economic analysis of
consumer mistakes in the mortgage market and also rationalizes failure-toswitch mistakes. Part III proposes preliminary measures the government
can take to reduce the search-and-switching costs, thereby helping
consumers improve their ex post welfare. Part IV concludes the discussion.
The Appendix includes proofs of the propositions.
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EVIDENCE OF SLUGGISH REFINANCING AS FAILURE-TO-SWITCH
MISTAKES

Despite the prospect of a large saving, many borrowers are slow to
refinance in a declining interest rate environment.11 Three points of
clarification are in order. First, whether consumers are slow to refinance is
a concept relative to the falling interest rate. Recent rate declines have
indeed triggered vigorous refinancing activities. But to the extent there still
remains a significant segment of consumers who could benefit substantially
from refinancing but are not choosing to, this is foregone consumer surplus.
Second, sluggish refinancing should not be viewed merely as a
consequence of switching costs, because we are discussing opportunities
that can yield in a substantial saving for consumers even after incurring all
necessary switching costs. Third, “refinancing” in this Article refers only
to the case of refinancing the existing mortgage to take advantage of
reduced interest rate. Our analysis does not apply to cash-out refinancing,
which depends not only on available interest rate but also on the general
condition of the housing market and the consumer’s future expected
income stream.
That said, there are legitimate reasons as to why a given individual
borrower may appear sluggish in refinancing: (i) he may in actuality be
“locked in” from refinancing as a result of a significant decline in his home
value;12 (ii) he may not qualify for attractive rates due to his low credit
scores; (iii) he may be expecting to move in the near future; or (iv) he has
reason to believe the rate will decline further still in the near future. In
other words, not all instances of sluggish refinancing can be considered
mistakes on the consumer’s part.
Recent studies, however, have controlled for many of these factors
and have ultimately come to view the residual, unexplainable segment
behavior as mistakes from consumers who lack sophistication in
refinancing. For example, Campbell documents that as of 2003, a quarter
of the households from his sample were paying more than two percent
above the prevailing market rate, even after controlling for other adverse

11. We are concerned only with home equity extraction refinancing—refinancing to
reduce monthly payments by reducing the interest rate associated with borrowing. It does
not deal with cash-out refinancing.
12. See, e.g., Andrew Caplin et al., Collateral Damage: Refinancing Constraints and
Regional Recessions, 29 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 496 (1997) (arguing that decreased
property values constrain mortgage refinancing); Wayne Archer et al., The Effect of Income
and Collateral Constraints on Residential Mortgage Termination, 25–26 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5180, 1996) (exploring household characteristics on
mortgage prepayment behavior).
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factors such as declined property value and likelihood of relocation.13 For a
two hundred thousand dollar loan, for example, this error could translate to,
on average, four thousand to six thousand dollars a year that could readily
be saved.14 Importantly, Campbell documents that those borrowers who
were less educated, earned lower income, and members of a minority group
were more likely to suffer from failing to refinance15—a finding shared by
a number of subsequent studies.16 He concludes that “prompt refinancing
requires financial sophistication.”17 This is a crucial observation because it
indicates that any satisfactory theory of failure-to-switch mistakes should
account for the systematic gap based on consumer sophistication.
Campbell does not completely rule out the possibility “that bettereducated household have better credit quality and can obtain mortgages on
more favorable terms.” But he finds that even after controlling for
mortgage rates likely available to households, “the effects of race and
education remain significant.”18 He concludes that these must be irrational
investment mistakes. As further support, he notes that many households
appear not to be even aware of their mortgage rates.19
Goodstein documents that, during the boom leading up to 2007, when
the interest rate was rising, low- and moderate-income homeowners more
13. John Y. Campbell, Household Finance, 61 J. FIN. 1553, 1579–85 (2006)
[hereinafter Campbell, Household Finance].
14. This is an average calculation. The exact amount of savings would depend on how
the loan is amortized, and how much of the principal the borrower has already paid off.
This figure also does not capture the potential tax savings, which would also depend on the
borrower’s tax bracket.
15. Campbell, Household Finance, supra note 13.
16. See, e.g., Simon Firestone et al., The Performance of Low-Income and Minority
Mortgages, 35 REAL EST. ECON. 479, 479 (2007) (stating that “low-income borrowers are
less likely to prepay when it is optimal, whereas black and Hispanic borrowers prepay more
slowly than other borrowers, regardless of the option’s value”); Ryan M. Goodstein,
Refinancing Trends Among Lower Income Homeowners during the Housing Boom and Bust
7 n.10 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Working Paper, 2011), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/
2011policysummit/papers/C3_Goodstein.pdf (illustrating that “from 2007 to 2010, the
average credit score on owner occupied, 1–4 family mortgages increased from 713 to 761
for conventional loans, and from 626 to 702 for FHA loans . . . ”).
17. Campbell, Household Finance, supra note 13, at 1581.
18. Id. at 1585. To arrive at this conclusion, Campbell replaced “self-reported
mortgage rates with average Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation rates prevailing at
the mortgage origination date . . . .” Id.
19. Id. at 1584 n.27. To be sure, consumer irrationality has been documented in
delayed refinancing in other contexts: for example, consumers have also been found to
exhibit a sunk-cost fallacy in refinancing, whereby those who paid points to secure lower
rates were less likely to refinance when the interest rate declined. Yan Chang & Abdullah
Yavas, Do Borrowers Make Rational Choices on Points and Refinancing?, 1 (Working
Paper, 2006), available at http://www.vermontmortgageadvisor.com/assets/files/Chang.%20
Yavas.%20PennState.pdf.
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frequently prepaid their mortgages; by contrast, after the 2007 collapse, as
the interest rate was declining, the same group was slower to prepay their
mortgages—indicating a pervasive refinancing mistake among low and
moderate-income homeowners.20 In its full specification, Goodstein’s
model controls for credit and income constraints, collateral constraints, and
other time invariant factors. He still finds that even after controlling for all
these, the low- and moderate-income homeowners were slower to repay
their mortgages.
Hedberg and Krainer document another interesting pattern—namely
that refinancing seems to be particularly sluggish as the interest rate was
approaching a historic low. They report that the prepayment data in 2010
was only half the expected rate21 based on a predictive model calibrated
using historical refinancing patterns: specifically, the rate of refinancing
was 2.5 percent in reality as opposed to the predicted 5.26 percent. They
further argue that fallen house prices cannot explain this discrepancy since
the model accounts for such factors.22 Although they provide several
possible reasons, they ultimately conclude that the recent slow-down in
refinancing cannot be explained by their models.23 Their model thus
suggests a possible nonlinear negative relationship between interest rate
and the refinancing lag.
As anecdotal evidence, in October 2010, a special report by Moody’s
Analytics also documented that “more than half of all outstanding
mortgages carr[ied] coupons above 5.75%” when the interest rate was at
“an all-time low of 4.32% at the end of September.”24 As of September
2011, the interest rate was at another historic low, but the media again
reported that consumers were slow to take advantage of the favorable
opportunity.25
Overall, evidence seems fairly consistent that when the interest rate
declines, many homeowners forego opportunities that can save them
several thousand dollars a year. To be sure, multiple interpretations are
possible with the given empirical evidence. Some sluggish refinancing
may reflect a rational expectation of further rate decline. But this is not an
20. Goodstein, supra note 16, at 23.
21. William Hedberg & John Krainer, Mortgage Prepayments and Changing
Underwriting Standards, FRBSF ECON. LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bd., San Francisco, Cal.),
July 19, 2010, at 3.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id.
24. Mark Zandi & Cris Deritis, Restringing HARP: The Case for More Refinancing
Now, MOODY’S ANALYTICS 1 (Oct. 7, 2010).
25. Chuck Jaffe, Mortgage Rates at Record Lows, But No Re-Fi Boom, MARKETWATCH
(Sept. 15, 2011, 12:41 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/mortgage-rates-at-recordlows-but-no-re-fi-boom-2011-09-15.
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entirely satisfactory explanation in the aggregate: such interpretation
would still require an explanation as to why a particular socioeconomic
group of consumers is systematically more likely to expect a rate decline,
compared to other consumers. Status quo bias or some type of consumer
inertia may also help explain a portion of this refinancing lag. At the same
time, we are reluctant to accept failure-to-switch mistakes solely as a broad
result of “consumer inertia,” without compelling evidence establishing that
less sophisticated consumers are more likely to suffer from the problem of
inertia or laziness.
We note, however, an alternate hypothesis which cannot be rejected
without further investigation: lenders may be systematically discriminating
against certain types of consumers by not availing their best mortgage
products to them. Indeed, if this hypothesis is true, it would account for
both failure-to-switch mistakes as well as product-choice mistakes. For the
time being, however, we have chosen to focus our inquiry on how lack of
consumer sophistication can feed into consumers’ refinancing choices—in
a manner consistent with most of the existing literature on consumer
mistakes.
After all, it should not be altogether surprising that consumers fail to
switch their mortgage products efficiently. Similar inefficient sticky
behavior has been documented in the context of credit card management,26
investment portfolio management such as 401(k) accounts,27 and checking
or savings accounts.28 This may indicate that a more general case for
empowering consumers to switch their replaceable financial products more
swiftly. But it is not our intention to address this general inquiry in this
Article. We focus on the case of refinancing for two reasons. First,
because mortgage payments usually represent a major portion of household
expenditure, consumers stand to save a significant amount from efficient
refinancing. Second, this mistake belongs squarely within the types of
26. See infra note 45.
27. See, e.g., Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia
in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 141 Q. J. ECON. 1149, 1158–66 (2001)
(finding that 401(k) participation rates increase significantly under automatic enrollment
plans).
28. See Elizabeth K. Kiser, Household Switching Behavior at Depository Institutions:
Evidence from Survey Data, 47 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 619, 620 (2002) (explaining that
consumers face a lag in switching depository institutions and documenting that customers
are not sensitive to prices); Elizabeth K. Kiser, Predicting Household Switching Behavior
and Switching Costs at Depository Institutions, 20 REV. OF INDUS. ORG. 349 (2002) (noting
the resulting lag from switching depository institutions and customer insensitivity to price);
Joanna Stavins, Checking Accounts: What Do Banks Offer and What Do Consumers Value?,
1999
NEW
ENG.
ECON.
REV.
3,
11
(1999),
available
at
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/neer/neer1999/neer299a.pdf (“Because of high costs of
switching banks, depositors respond to new charges with a lag.”).
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economic inefficiencies regulators currently seek to address through
mortgage regulation.
II.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRODUCT-CHOICE MISTAKES VERSUS
FAILURE-TO-SWITCH MISTAKES

The first part of business before engaging in an economic analysis of
consumer mistakes is to understand what is meant by a “mistake” in this
literature. We all make judgment calls that are ex ante reasonable but turn
out to be poor choices ex post, but it may not serve us much to refer to all
such instances as “mistakes.” For example, it is ex ante reasonable to
purchase an adjustable-rate mortgage (“ARM”) offering a lower interest
rate instead of a fixed-rate mortgage (“FRM”) if you believe the rate will
stay low; if the rate spikes up towards the end of the loan term, it turns out
to have been an unfortunate choice ex post. Likewise, if you have no plans
to move, it is ex ante reasonable to secure a lower rate by agreeing to a
prepayment penalty; if you unexpectedly lose your job next year and must
relocate, it is a regrettable choice ex post. But these unfortunate decisions
are just part of life: they still indicate rational decision-making. In this
Article, we are only interested in consumers’ mistakes insofar as they are
apparently irrational. By this we mean that, from a sophisticated and
informed party’s perspective, the consumer could be doing much better but
is not opting to do so.
Such apparently irrational choices can occur either in choosing a
product or after having chosen one. This distinction is important because
addressing them, we argue, requires different strategies.
A.

Heuristic Differences

Our first claim is that product-choice mistakes and failure-to-switch
mistakes are heuristically distinct. In other words, the problems consumers
must solve to make optimal decisions in the two instances are
fundamentally different.
A product-choice mistake can occur when a consumer seeks a new
financing arrangement; either original financing or refinancing. The
consumer may be looking to buy a house or a car. The favorable market
condition has convinced him to refinance. In these cases, the central
question is:
Given that (i) I must finance my debt, (ii) various products offer
competing benefits and costs, and (iii) there is uncertainty as to
which particular future state in which I will end up, which
product is optimal for me for the foreseeable course of my debt?
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Product-choice mistakes concern ex ante efficiency: some consumers
are choosing probabilistically and foreseeably inferior products, as
compared to other readily available options. To be sure, all ex ante
efficiency mistakes will affect ex post welfare: poor product choices
adversely affect future repayment obligations and economic welfare. But if
this was largely predictable—for example, by a sophisticated predatory
lender—it represents an ex ante efficiency mistake.
Failure-to-switch mistakes, by contrast, concern ex post welfare
improvement, given an unanticipated market shock.29 It is a mistake if
consumers, for no apparent reason, forego available refinancing options
that are certain to increase wealth substantially. The failure-to-switch
problem focuses on the following question:
Is there an alternate financing option that is unambiguously
superior to my current terms under all realistic future states (e.g.,
given my spending pattern or plans to stay) and accounting for all
pertinent transaction costs?
The product-choice problem usually cannot afford this simple
question. The consumer’s difficult choice is seldom between two products,
where one is unambiguously superior to the other. His mistakes are along
the line of focusing on short-term costs versus long-term costs, or having
unreasonably optimistic expectation of his future state—factors which
render product comparison more ambiguous. But if the interest rate
declines substantially, the consumer may indeed find a refinancing
arrangement that is, for all intents and purposes, unambiguously welfareimproving.30
There are further heuristic differences. Failure-to-switch mistakes
concern timely refinancing, which is not always required of consumers. If
consumers find it too taxing to search, they may not even look for
opportunities. Product-choice mistakes, by contrast, are more likely to be
exogenously triggered, such as one’s desire or need to purchase a house or
relocate. Put differently, the opportunity cost of not engaging in a search is
different for the two problems: one who does not search for refinancing
options foregoes a probabilistic saving of an uncertain amount that may or

29. To be more accurate, failure-to-switch mistakes concern ex post welfare
improvement with respect to the realized rate decline. However, they also involve some ex
ante efficiency concerns, such as the possibility of moving in the future, which may affect
the profitability of refinancing.
30. It is also possible that the consumer will decide to refinance and choose a product
that is not unambiguously better, but still superior in expectation—e.g., refinancing from a
fixed-rate mortgage to an adjustable-rate mortgage. In this case, the problem again will
reduce to either a reasonable mistake or a product-choice mistake, rather than a failure-toswitch mistake.
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may not be out there; by contrast, one who does not search for original
financing options cannot buy a house.
Second and relatedly, the fixed costs involved—such as search and
closing costs—can be a significant barrier both economically and
psychologically in refinancing. This is different with original financing: it
is far less likely that the consumer will be discouraged to buy a house
because the purchase entails title insurance fees and appraisal fees.31
Third, for those motivated to switch, timing is a more independent
variable of choice than in original financing. This is critical because it
indicates reasonable mistakes can occur on both sides: some may refinance
too soon, and others may wait too long. Although timing can also play a
role in home purchase decisions, product-choice mistakes still take place in
a fixed moment in time—the mistake is choosing the wrong product among
all the products available at a certain period.
Finally, the calculus of loan comparison is also different for these two
problems. The product-choice problem often admits an item-by-item
comparison of comparable terms among competing loans—such as lender
commissions, points, or APRs, etc. In refinancing, the benchmark of
comparison is the existing mortgage, and the consumer needs to compare in
essence the APR of a new loan against the going-forward APR of his
partially-amortized loan to understand the cost saving.
Table 1 summarizes the foregoing points.32
Table 1. Heuristic Differences Between Product-Choice Mistakes and
Failure-to-Switch Mistakes
PROBLEMS
Relevant
Inquiry

Search Trigger
Timing
Fixed Cost

PRODUCT-CHOICE
Expected utility
maximization based among
products presenting different
welfare outcomes in different
future states
Exogenous needs
Exogenously determined
Marginal deterrent effect (or

FAILURE-TO-SWITCH
Unambiguous welfare
improvements in all realistic
future states due to declined
interest rate
Not always present
Endogenously determined
Significant deterrent effect

31. Similarly, fixed costs are no longer relevant to those who already made up their
minds to refinance.
32. There is also a practical difference between the product-choice problem and the
failure-to-switch problem. In original financing, the consumer can usually seek advice from
his or her realtor, who likely has an existing long-term relationship with a broker or a lender
and can also make a general recommendation of a suitable mortgage product. In the case of
refinancing, the consumer usually does not have any intermediary who can provide such
advice or helpful contact.
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Possible to make an item-byitem comparison, or compare
the disclosed APRs
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Comparison between goingforward loan obligation of the
incumbent loan against a brand
new loan term with multiple
items

In terms of proposals for addressing consumer mistakes, a number of
suggestions exist for addressing product-choice mistakes. Dodd-Frank
disallows many forms of mortgages, such as balloon payments or
prepayment penalties in high-cost mortgages.33 The Bureau is considering
a new mortgage disclosure requirement by seeking input from consumers.34
Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir recommend a sticky opt-out policy whereby
consumers must first be offered a standardized thirty-year, fixed-rate
mortgage and can switch out to alternative forms, but at certain costs.35
None of these measures are specifically intended to address failure-toswitch mistakes. Nor do we believe any of these measures will be
particularly effective in addressing them. At best, more effective
disclosure regulation can help consumers compare across various available
products. Before we recommend a solution, however, it will serve us well
to understand possible underlying causes as to why some borrowers fail to
switch efficiently.
B.

Shared Underlying Causes

It has become a favorite pastime among economists to rationalize, or
otherwise theorize, apparently irrational consumer behavior. The literature
is now vast, and it is not our intention to provide a comprehensive review
here.36 Our aim is to tell a brief, overall story about the market. The first
step of studying consumer mistakes is to understand why they arise: this is
where the literature can rely on models to rationalize observed behavior.
The second step is to understand why they persist: this is trying to
understand why market forces by themselves will not solve the problem. In
this section, we review the traditional justifications which rationalize the
33. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–
203, § 1021 (2010).
34. Abby Gregory, CFPB’s New Mortgage Disclosure Initiatives Gaining Traction,
THE M REPORT (Sept. 30, 2011), available at http://www.themreport.com/articles/cfpbsnew-mortgage-disclosure-initiatives-gaining-traction-2011-09-30.
35. See Michael S. Barr et al., supra note 6 (arguing for an opt-out mortgage policy).
36. For an excellent survey article, see Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 7 (introducing
the case for comprehensive consumer financial protection regulation).
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occurrences and persistence of product-choice mistakes—of which much
has been written. We then turn to see whether those justifications can
explain the persistence of failure-to-switch mistakes—of which very little
has been written.
1. Product-Choice Mistakes
According to the neoclassical framework, a rational, informed
consumer who can reasonably predict his future state will use a credit
arrangement to borrow money if and only if the net present value of the
expected benefit of borrowing exceeds the net present value of the expected
cost. Here, the economic cost includes interest-rate costs, potential penalty
fees, and potential costs related to bankruptcy and/or foreclosure. The
rational-actor model predicts that every transaction should be (at least,
statistically) ex ante welfare-enhancing. Economists have since sought to
modify certain assumptions to reconcile the model with the fact that a
significant segment of consumers appear to make product-choice mistakes
consistently.
There are two prominent modifications: either the average consumer
makes his borrowing decision without being fully informed, or he is given
full information but is unable to properly calculate the total cost of
borrowing.37 In this Article, we loosely refer to these stories as lack of
information and lack of expertise. Either way, we can say the market is
“obfuscated” in the following sense: regardless of any specific intent
among market participants, the equilibrium condition is such that the
market is not allowing the unsophisticated consumer to fully appreciate the

37. Another usual modification used to explain consumer behavior in the credit market
is hyperbolic discounting, which has mostly been used to model two particular patterns of
behavior: (i) impulsive spending (more precisely, the consumer’s inability to commit his
future self to not spend), and (ii) myopia (or, optimization over short-term costs rather than
full costs). With regard to impulsive spending, we view this medication as being more
relevant to credit card usage rather than mortgage product choices. Credit card debt deals
with continuous spending, rather than a fixed sum. See, e.g., Stefano Della Vigna & Ulrike
Malmendier, Contract Design and Self Control: Theory and Evidence, 119 Q. J. ECON. 353,
393–94 (2004) (exploring contract design in the credit market). The use of hyperbolic
discounting in analyzing product choices has not been as prominent except insofar as it can
imply myopia. But see Andra C. Ghent, Subprime Mortgages, Mortgage Choice, and
Hyperbolic Discounting (Working Paper, 2011), available at http://aux.zicklin.baruch.
cuny.edu/ghent/research/SubprimeandHyperbolic.pdf (using hyperbolic discounting to
explore the “implications of offering households the choice between traditional fullyamortizing mortgages that require substantial down payments . . . and mortgages that
involve lower initial payments. In this Article, however, we have chosen to treat myopia as
a form of lack of expertise (e.g., inability to fully internalize deferred costs), and have
chosen not to treat hyperbolic discounting as a separate modification.
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total wealth hand risk effects of choosing a given mortgage product.
Although plausible, these two stories are incomplete until we can explain
why the market permits these problems.
a. Lack of Information.
The lack-of-information story simply posits that lenders withhold key
information about products’ suitability and thereby extract information rent
from borrowers. For example, a borrower may sign up for a fixed-rate
mortgage featuring a substantial prepayment penalty, of which he is
unaware, and may bear the consequence later on. This story begs the
question as to why lenders are not then competing on the basis of
disclosing such information.
Several answers have been given. First, there may be a freeriding or
collective action problem among lenders. As Bar-Gill and Warren explain,
many products share the same feature in this relatively-standardized
market. Consequently, a lender may engage in costly advertising to inform
consumers of a certain hidden feature that other lenders may be using to
extract rent from their consumers, and design and market a product without
such disadvantageous feature. He may then win over consumers initially,
but other lenders may follow suit and likewise eliminate such feature, and
they will eventually compete away all the profits. Anticipating this, the
original lender will choose not to compete along this dimension, and the
market equilibrium prevents the disclosing competitor from winning over
consumers.38
Second, there may be imperfect competition due to the transaction cost
of identifying and reaching relevant potential consumers. For example, the
incumbent lender has an informational advantage over competitors
regarding his consumer’s creditworthiness. In the case of predatory
mortgage refinancing,39 the incumbent lender can use this advantage to
make a particular loan offer that is tailored for the consumer to default,
while earning greater interests payments up until the point of default.40

38. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 7, at n.30 and accompanying text.
39. See Philip Bond, et al., Predatory Mortgage Lending, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 412, 412
(2009) (finding that “predatory lending is associated with highly collateralized loans,
inefficient refinancing of subprime loans, lending without due regard to ability to pay,
prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and poorly informed borrowers”).
40. Id. at 413. Bond provides two scenarios of predatory lending. First, the lender may
offer a refinancing option to a homeowner facing foreclosure, to extract more payments,
even as foreclosure remains unavoidable under the new arrangement. Second, the lender
may provide a cash-out refinancing to a homeowner who is otherwise in the path to
completing his mortgage, so as to bring about foreclosure.
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Third, there may be instances of ineffective competitor advertising,
also known as the “curse of debiasing.”41 According to one theory, a
competing vendor may not be incentivized either to disclose or to engage in
a negative advertisement for other vendors, if such disclosure would not
actually result in informed consumers switching over but simply result in
the consumers’ taking self-help measures—such as devising ways to make
sure they do not fall victim to certain adverse features—to improve their
welfare.
Note also that if market conditions allow for less-than-full disclosure
on the part of lenders, a natural corollary is that even when lenders are
mandated to disclose information, they would choose to do so in a format
consumers cannot easily process. If consumers are rational but they incur
high information processing costs, then the same story can also explain
why lenders may not compete to disclose information in a more consumerfriendly manner.
b. Lack of Expertise.
The second story rationalizes how a group of consumers may
subscribe to welfare-reducing credit arrangements even under perfect
competition. This is explained by a lack of expertise by a select group of
the population—usually the undereducated and the poor. Naïve consumers
may myopically focus on short-term costs while sophisticated consumers
know how to minimize long-term costs.42 Firms can then offer low initial
costs and exorbitant long-term costs or add-on prices, such as through
products featuring hidden fees and teaser rates. Indeed, deferred payments
are a common feature in many mortgage products. Negative amortization
and interest-only mortgages, which grew in prevalence prior to the crisis,
likewise feature low teaser rates which increase after a pre-set period. A
similar division may also occur when borrowers are given the option of
paying points to reduce interest rates and myopically focused consumers
forego this opportunity. Under competition, the eventual effect here is a
cross-subsidization of sophisticated consumers by naïve consumers who
lack the expertise to evaluate credit arrangements.
One reason why the lack of expertise can persist is because there may
be insufficient incentives for the market to educate consumers. Sellers can
41. See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505, 507–09 (2006)
(providing the example that a fraction of consumers who learn about hidden attributes still
prefer to stay with the incumbent vendor and take measures to minimize those hidden costs,
while uninformed consumers continue to pay for the hidden costs).
42. Id.
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usually take better advantage of naïve consumers. Competitors may be
unwilling to educate these naïve consumers because once they learn to
estimate the true costs, they may be able to find means to reduce the costs
themselves, rather than switching over to the competitor who chose to
disclose everything.43 As Gabaix and Laibson argue that “[n]ewly educated
consumers (i.e., sophisticates) are not profitable to any firm.” 44 Therefore,
at equilibrium, the information revealed may be insufficient to promote full
transparency and simplicity.
2. Failure-to-Switch Mistakes
Unlike product-choice mistakes, economic rationalization of failureto-switch mistakes in the mortgage market has been sparse.45 In this Part,
we seek to understand why failure-to-switch mistakes arise by applying the
insights from recent advances in microeconomic theory of product search.
We then turn to understand why they persist by applying the lessons we
have learned about this market from product-choice mistakes.
We again begin with a neoclassical benchmark. First, the switching
problem: given a new loan offer, a rational consumer under a payment
obligation will switch if the net present value of the cost under the new
arrangement plus the cost of switching is lower than that under the existing
arrangement and if he does not expect a greater saving from waiting. As
stated, this is a complex problem involving a closed form of optimal
refinancing, which can only be solved if one makes certain assumptions
43. Id.
44. Id. at 520.
45. For sluggish patterns in credit card switching, however, three different explanations
have been put forth. First, consumers may be reluctant to switch if they irrationally believe
that they will pay off the existing debt a lot sooner than can be reasonably expected.
Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AMER.
ECON. REV. 50, 71–72 (1991). Second, credit card borrowing may be inversely correlated
with a household’s willingness to search and shop for best available financing schemes—
meaning, households with larger balances have greater disutility of search. Paul S. Calem &
Loretta J. Mester, Consumer Behavior and the Stickiness of Credit-Card Interest Rates, 85
AMER. ECON. REV. 1327, 1330–33 (1995). But see Paul S. Calem et al., Switching Costs
and Adverse Selection in the Market for Credit Cards: New Evidence, 30 J. BANKING & FIN.
1653, 1655–60 (2006) (refuting Calem & Mester’s 1995 argument with later data). Third,
the magnitude of the switching cost may be stochastically realized, in that the disutility of
switching depends on the consumer’s busy schedule and other conditions, including their
emotional state, at the time of receiving solicitation, all of which cannot be perfectly
predicted. Therefore, consumers systematically underestimate the switching costs at the
time of signing up for an initial card and once switching costs are realized they are unable to
take action. Haiyan Shui & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card
Market (Working Paper, January 30, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=586622.
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about the movement of interest rate.46 We need not actually solve this
problem for our discussion. We can simplify it by requiring only that the
net present value of the cost under the new arrangement is substantially
lower than that under the existing arrangement.47 Our modest focus is
helping consumers take advantage of clearly and substantially wealthenhancing opportunities where present. In addition, a regulatory success in
this domain can be measured without having to solve the optimal
refinancing problem: we can indirectly measure it by looking at the extent
to which the systematic refinancing gap that currently exists between
sophisticated households and unsophisticated households is reduced. This
will reveal whether regulation is helping unsophisticated households mimic
the behavior of sophisticated households.
This switching problem in turn informs the consumer’s search
problem. According to Stigler’s theory of search, a consumer in possession
of an offer will not search for a new product if his marginal cost of search
is greater than the expected benefit, given his understanding about the
distribution of prices out there.48 Applying this insight, we assume that the
consumer under an obligation to make certain mortgage payments receives
signals about the distribution of available products from advertisements and
direct solicitation. If the signals perfectly correlate with the actual
distribution, there is no reason a priori to expect a statistically significant
deviation from the normative theory’s prediction.
Suppose on the other hand that lenders cannot credibly communicate
the offer terms, and therefore the consumer believes that a signal only
poorly indicates a particular offer. The consumer must make a costly
investment to understand the actual terms, which may be much less
attractive.
We model this as follows. At the beginning of each period the
consumer receives a signal or a series of signals regarding available
products. The signals convey some information regarding the distribution
of available products. The consumer then decides whether to engage in the
costly search. Given a signal of the interest rate, let the actual effective
interest rate of the product be uniformly distributed between
.
is the level of market obfuscation: the signal is perfect when
. The

46. See, e.g., Sumit Agarwal et al., Optimal Mortgage Refinancing: A Closed Form
Solution (Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty
/laibson/files/Mortgage%20refinancing.pdf (deriving a closed-form optimal refinancing
rule).
47. A usual metric used by mortgage brokers is to match the two values and use that as
the threshold. Id. at 26.
48. George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 218–19
(1961).
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consumer is aware of and must incur a search cost of
to fully
verify the offer, where
. This functional form of the search cost is
chosen to satisfy three conditions: the search cost is (i) zero when
(ii) increasing in , and (iii) is strictly convex in the level of obfuscation.49
Under the set up, we have the following Proposition, which we prove
in the Appendix:
Proposition 1 (Failure-to-Switch Mistakes). Suppose lenders
cannot credibly convey the true interest rate and there is a
uniformly-distributed obfuscation in the market. If the consumer
must incur a search cost to understand the terms of the product,
strictly convex on the level of obfuscation, then we will observe
sluggish refinancing behaviors in the form of consumers’ failures
to make timely refinancing switches. In addition, as empirically
observed, the lag will be increasing in the level of obfuscation
and the personal search cost coefficient, and decreasing in the
principal remaining.
One way to interpret this proposition is that consumers, especially
unsophisticated consumers, facing high search and processing costs,
demand a premium in signal decline before searching into given product
offers. This is empirically consistent with Fuster and Willen’s finding that
search activity for refinance loans is lower among low credit score
borrowers.50 The intuition is similar to the idea that information asymmetry
49. The assumption of a strict convex search cost is consistent with the literature. For
example, Ellison & Wolitzky also use a strictly convex search cost depending on time spent
on searching, which increases with the level of obfuscation. See, e.g., Glenn Ellison &
Alexander Wolitzky, “A Search Cost Model of Obfuscation” (Working Paper No. 15237,
2008), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/3202 (assuming a strictly convex search
cost depending on the level of obfuscation). They explain specifically that “banks can be
thought of as practicing obfuscation when they fail to post complete lists of their account
fees in a prominent location.” Id. at 11. Likewise, lenders can be thought of as practicing
obfuscation when they do not clearly present the effective costs of borrowing. One
difference is that we interpret the spread of the available interest rates as indicating the level
of obfuscation. Alternatively, we might assume that each offer entails a different search
cost, where the search cost depends not on the spread of available products, but instead on
the actual spread of the given product to its signal—meaning the higher the effective rate of
the product, the greater the search cost to understand the terms because there is so much
hidden information to process. Such a set-up would not change the model because in this
case we can work with the consumer’s expectation of the search cost, which again becomes
a quadratic function. In this case, the expected search cost of a given offer is the integral of
from 0 to , divided by . This turns out to be
.
50. Andreas Fuster & Paul S. Willen, $1.25 Trillion Is Still Real Money: Some Facts
About the Effects of the Federal Reserve’s Mortgage Market Investments, 21–23 (Fed.
Reserve Bd. of Bos., Working Paper No. 10–4, 2010), available at
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2010/ppdp1004.pdf. The authors, however, attribute
the relatively low search activity among low-credit borrowers on the additional fees these
borrowers must bear. Id. at 4.
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in trading stocks can result in bid-ask spreads because uninformed
investors tend to worry about the possibility of trading with better-informed
investors. This is a form of rational market non-participation in the
refinancing market among those who have chosen to take out mortgages for
exogenous reasons. Alternatively, we can also analogize this lag to
instances of price dispersion that can exist under competition when
consumers must incur high search costs.51 In this sense, failure-to-switch
mistakes are not really mistakes in actuality, but a manifestation of
consumers’ rational responses to their lack of sophistication.
Although the search cost and the lack of communication mechanism
will slow down refinancing in the declining market, the search cost that can
justify the amount of lag observed would have to be significant. One
reason for this lag may be that the consumer only gets a probabilistic sense
of the comparative value of the new loan after the initial search. For
example, the consumer may feel like he can understand the terms of the
new loan sufficiently after one reading to conclude with fifty percent
confidence that this is indeed a better deal for him, but he is not actually
sure. His confidence level may increase up to seventy-five percent after
three readings. It may be that he has to devote a substantial resource to
actually conclude definitively that the new loan terms are better.
Alternatively, to the extent the search takes place after the consumer
has already decided to engage in search, what matters in terms of the
consumer’s decision is the perceived search cost, not the actual. Someone
who has refinanced once before will have a better sense than one who has
never refinanced of the actual search cost involved.
Indeed,
demographically, those exhibiting a lag are indeed younger borrowers, who
as a group are less likely to have refinanced previously.
Proposition 1 may explain why in practice those who are slow to
refinance optimally tend to be more prevalent among less educated, poorer,
and minority consumers. Consistent also with Proposition 1 is Campbell’s
observation that “[h]igh mortgage rates tended to be paid on slightly
smaller mortgages, so the shares of mortgage value that paid high rates
were somewhat lower . . . .”52

51. Campbell, Consumer Financial Protection, supra note 1, at 93 (explaining how
“price dispersion . . . can be sustained by the existence of search costs that make some
consumers willing to pay higher prices than they might find elsewhere”). In Ellison &
Wolitzky’s article, they assume that a fraction µ of the consumers can search costlessly,
while 1 – µ of them face search costs. They summarize this type of market condition as
follows: “There is a more natural search problem when price dispersion is present, and
price dispersion will exist in equilibrium when consumers are differentially informed.”
Ellison & Wolitzky, supra note 49, at 1.
52. Campbell, Household Finance, supra note 13, at 1579.
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In the remainder of this section, we explore how market obfuscation
may arise in practice and why the market would allow it.
a. Lack of Information.
Our result on refinancing activity can be interpreted as stating that
consumers who are in a position to refinance make their decision of
whether to refinance based on an insufficient set of information, because
the full economic ramification of refinancing is not clearly or credibly
presented.
We advance three interpretations as to how lenders and brokers can
fail to credibly communicate their offers in practice. First, consumers may
mistrust the available information.53 In any market, consumers must
distinguish good products from bad products. The rise of the Internet and
the development of related technologies are often thought to have greatly
reduced consumers’ search costs; unfortunately, the opposite may be true
as well. The difficulty with searching for products today is not the absence
of products but rather a surplus of them. There have also been frequent
instances of predatory refinancing and consumer fraud. Our tendency to
product advertisement that guarantees great savings is one of skepticism,
rather than enthusiasm. Lenders offering genuinely opportune deals may
find it difficult to reach consumers in a credible, certifiable manner.54
Second, mortgage contracts may contain too many add-on costs. For
example, a mortgage product comes advertised as a four percent product.
But upon closer inspection, it may be that the terms contain too many addon costs—such as additional fees and late payment penalties, etc.—so that
the effective interest cost to the buyer is more like six percent. With all
these add-on costs, lenders cannot credibly convey the effective interest
costs of the mortgage. Add-on costs, however, should not be interpreted
solely as lenders’ intent to defraud helpless consumers. Where products
are relatively standardized but also customized on the margin, it may be
that buyers come in so many different types that lenders have no choice but
to offer a standard product equipped with add-on elements that are
narrowly tailored for each consumer’s needs. In this case, it would not

53. See, e.g., Campbell, Consumer Financial Protection, supra note 1, at 93 (“Even
with disclosure rules in place, lack of trust is a problem that may lead consumers to avoid
the use of certain financial products altogether . . . .”).
54. For example, as of September 2011, when the interest rate reached a historic low, a
study conducted by LendingTree.com revealed that even though “[r]efinancing is something
that is going to be saving [the consumers] hundreds of dollars a month and yet the first three
emotions consumers said they feel when they think about it were anxiety, nervousness and
overwhelmed.” Jaffe, supra note 25.
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necessarily be cost-effective for lenders to advertise each product’s distinct
feature effectively.
Third and relatedly, lenders and brokers may all be genuine in their
offers but may simply choose to employ different advertisement strategies.
Some may provide zero-closing cost financing options because they want
to appeal to consumers who are otherwise deterred by fixed costs. Others
may advertise lower interest rates, but with hidden add-on costs. Lenders
and brokers may also vary in terms of transparency as well. Some may
want to entice consumers first and then explain the add-on costs; others
may believe reputation matters and thus they want to be upfront from the
outset about all possible costs. It is possible that this heterogeneous
strategy among lenders represents equilibrium.55 If this is the case,
consumers may need to incur search costs to distinguish the offers and their
strategic advertisements.
For these reasons, consumers may rationally forego making the costly
investment to search into a product even when the offer seems reasonable.
But as the market’s interest rate declines further still, and consumers
receive better offers, they may perceive a higher probability of actual
saving and eventually be convinced of the legitimacy of such cost-saving
products.
Meanwhile, a general story based on the search cost, the lack of
credible communication mechanism, and resulting consumer inertia or
mistrust still does not explain why the market cannot overcome it. For
example, why do competing lenders not disclose the terms in simpler
manner to let consumers understand the sheer magnitude of their failure-toswitch mistakes?
One likely reason is that lenders face a collective action problem, and
as a result, they may fail to develop a clear and transparent communication
mechanism. Insofar as a mechanism that can benefit one lender can
likewise benefit all other lenders, no one lender has sufficient incentive to
develop it. More importantly, even if one lender were to develop a
mechanism, it still remains costly—and possibly prohibitively so—for the
lender to convince consumers of its value.
Secondly, as with the story of predatory refinancing with incumbent
lender in product-choice mistakes, competing lenders may lack access to
information about the consumer’s existing loan to make a suitably enticing
and well-tailored refinancing offer in simple terms. Therefore, competition
55. See Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price
Elasticities on the Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427, 429 (2009) (“Price search engines and
other Internet tools will help consumers to find and to process information, but retailers may
simultaneously harness the power of the Internet to make information processing problems
more formidable and/or to make consumer informedness less damaging to their profits.”).
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is imperfect, and lenders cannot present terms of the comparative benefit in
an easily understood format. Although this is likely to be true to some
extent, we expect these problems to dissipate over time as informationsharing becomes more common in the future, for instance, through thirdparty vendors that allow data-sharing.
Even from the supplier side of the story, however, it is not entirely
clear whether lenders or brokers have sufficient incentive to invest in
establishing a credible communication mechanism. There may be several
reasons for which lenders and brokers may not much care to compete for
sluggish refinancers.56 In what follows we try to analyze the incentive
structure of lenders and brokers. For now, we assume lenders do not
securitize and sell their loans, but instead earn continuous profits from the
interest payments consumers make. We relax this assumption later.
Consider two lenders: say, Bank of America and Citibank. To begin
with, note that Bank of America under our assumption almost certainly has
no interest in letting its own customers know about low available rates,
given that it is earning profits from sluggish refinancers’ interest payments.
As a result, the incentive to capture sluggish refinancers is more likely to
originate from other lenders. But here we potentially have an ineffective
competitor advertising scenario. It may not serve Bank of America much
to make a credible and transparent offer to remind Citibank’s borrowers
that they are foregoing great refinancing opportunities. This is a market for
standardized goods. Most likely, Citibank’s borrowers can simply go to
Citibank and ask it to match Bank of America’s offer, which banks
frequently do honor. Citibank would prefer to reduce the rate than to lose
its customers. At the end of the day, Bank of America’s enticement would
only help a Citibank customer’s welfare without having him switch over to
Bank of America. Anticipating this, Bank of America may not want to
bother exerting any costly effort to entice incumbent borrowers of other
lenders. This is consistent with Gabaix and Laibson’s theory of how
certain product attributes may remain shrouded even under competition.57
Therefore, there is likely a suboptimal level of effort among competing
lenders to inform the current credit borrowers of new cost-saving products.

56. In this section, we make a simplification and treat all lenders as those who stand to
earn revenues from borrowers’ interest payments and brokers as those who earn fixed
commissions from originating loans. In reality, banks frequently securitize their loans and
sell them off as mortgage-backed securities. Banks come in two types: (i) large banks that
do in fact keep some of their loans without securitizing, and (ii) mortgage banks that
securitize nearly all of their loans. We believe the incentive structures for these banks fall in
the spectrum of pure lenders and pure brokers, and are thus sufficiently captured by our
analyses.
57. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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There also exists a potential lender collusion equilibrium because
neither Bank of America nor Citibank actually wants to see sluggish
refinancers eradicated from the market altogether. Banks earn positive
interest profits from consumers who fail to switch out promptly. Therefore,
although Bank of America may try to steal Citibank’s customers by
offering a rate Citibank is unwilling to match, the same strategy may be
used against Bank of America by Citibank in the next period. The end
result may be that both Bank of America and Citibank just sabotage their
own future profits for good. Anticipating this, Bank of America would not
bother undercutting Citibank. In short, while lenders may compete
vigorously for all consumers who approach them, they may otherwise have
no incentive to compete for existing consumers of other lenders. In the
Appendix, we establish the conditions for successful lender collusion, as
noted in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 (Lender Collusion Equilibrium). Suppose the
following three conditions hold: (i) lenders do not discount the
future too much, (ii) lenders expect interest rates will continue to
decline, and (iii) there is a positive fraction of population that is
ignorant of interest rate changes, or otherwise insensitive to
interest rate changes, unless specially made aware of those
changes (as in Proposition 1). Then a Nash equilibrium exists in
an infinitely repeated game under which lenders will continue to
compete for new borrowers, but will not make special effort—
even if it’s costless—to entice their competitors’ existing
borrowers by undercutting the interest rates.
Strengthening this result is the more general finding that players in a
repeated game may not even need any intent to collude for the collusion
equilibrium to be maintained. Paul Klemperer established that in multiperiod markets with consumer switching costs—such as the mortgage
market—the non-cooperative, competitive equilibrium can be the same as
the collusive outcome in an otherwise identical market without switching
costs.58

58. Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 102 Q. J. ECON. 375,
375–76 (1987); see also Paul Klemperer, The Competitiveness of Markets with Consumer
Switching Costs, 18 RAND J. ECON. 138, 139 (1987) (analyzing how switching costs affect
the competitiveness of markets).
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b. Lack of Expertise
Consistent with the lack-of-expertise story for product-choice
mistakes, it is also possible that less sophisticated consumers may tend to
focus myopically on short-term costs, and are unable to fully internalize the
long-term economic benefits of refinancing. They may be inefficient in
managing their mortgage products because the prospect of the closing cost
may discourage them from refinancing optimally. Even outside the
mortgage market, many experimental studies involving consumers and
search-and-switching costs have found that consumers tend to wait too long
to switch,59 as compared to what the normative theory would predict.
This problem is unlikely to persist if lenders or other market
participants can effectively educate consumers to internalize long-term
economic effects of refinancing when the interest rate is sufficiently low.
But in this market, competing mortgage lenders’ incentive to educate the
unsophisticated borrowers is compromised by the fact that once consumers
truly learn to manage their mortgages well, they can easily switch out of
the new products when the rate declines still further. Here again, we have a
situation where newly educated consumers are not profitable to any firm.
More generally, it seems that in a market where consumers have the
option to switch in and out of products, sellers will lack incentive to
educate consumers to make right switches out of the concern that they will
lose future profit streams. As a result, the refinancing market is
characterized by “comparison friction,” whereby the information necessary
to make transactional decisions may ultimately be available to customers,
but sellers deliberately present them in a suppressed manner.60
Let us next consider the incentive structure of brokers. The fact that
competition among lenders may not solve the problem of market
obfuscation, of course, does not necessarily indicate that competition
among brokers cannot solve this problem. Even as lenders may indeed not
compete for slow refinancers, brokers or other loan originating officers
may want to approach incumbent borrowers because their revenue models
are different from lenders: they often earn fixed commissions for
extending and consummating loans. This may explain why the letters we
59. See, e.g., John D. Cripps & Robert J. Meyer, Heuristics and Biases in timing the
Replacement of Durable Products, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 304, 312 (1994) (finding that
consumers tend to display a bias against replacing deteriorated products); Gal Zauberman,
The Intertemporal Dynamics of Consumer Lock-In, 30 J. CONSUMER RES. 405, 414–16
(2003) (finding that consumers have a decreased propensity to search and switch after an
initial investment).
60. Jeffrey R. Kling et al., Comparison Friction: Experimental Evidence from Medicare
Drug Plans (Working Paper No. 17410, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org
/~kling/choosing.pdf.
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receive on refinancing options are rarely from respectable banks but more
likely from little-known mortgage brokers. However, it is one thing to ask
whether brokers may find it profitable to originate loans to sluggish
refinancers—the answer to this narrow question is undoubtedly yes. It is
quite another to ask whether a fully transparent, credible communication
method would be profit-maximizing for brokers and, in addition, whether
they would be sufficiently incentivized to capture sluggish refinancers
while interest rate are declining. The answers to these latter questions are,
we submit, at least debatable for the following reasons.
First of all, transparency is a double-edged sword. On the one hand,
having a transparent communication mechanism may help brokers secure
slow refinancers who clearly stand to benefit substantially; on the other
hand, having such mechanism may bring about a loss of other refinancers
who unknowingly sign up for products that are not ex ante welfareenhancing. For example, this would be the case with predatory
refinancing. Brokers may be unwilling to win over sluggish consumers and
risk losing other naïve and possibly misled consumers.
Second, a transparent mechanism will almost certainly be
disadvantageous for brokers when the interest rate is increasing and the
market offers innovative, risky products to work around the high interest
rate. At an individual broker level, a consumption smoothing argument
may discourage brokers from introducing transparency in the market.
Another way to tell this story is that, at the aggregate level, there is a
relatively inelastic supply of brokers initially, and they all come with a
finite supply of time. When the interest rate is declining, brokers naturally
become so busy with all the demand for refinancing among efficient,
sophisticated refinancers that they may not be sufficiently incentivized to
capture sluggish refinancers. For this reason, even for brokers, their private
optimal level of obfuscation is unlikely to be zero.
So far, we have given a story as to why lenders who are assumed to
make continuous profits from interest payments may not be incentivized to
promote transparency in the refinancing market. We have also given a
story as to why brokers earning fixed commissions for loan consummation
may similarly not be incentivized to promote transparency. In practice,
many banks do not keep their loans, but securitize them and sell them off.
The precise extent will depend on each bank’s business model: some sell
nearly all their loans; others keep a significant portion of them. Without
going into the detailed pricing methods for securitized loans, we note only
that the incentives of these banks who securitize and sell a portion of their
loans are likely to be captured roughly as a linear combination of the
incentives of the above two entities, neither of which is fully incentivized
to promote transparency. Consequently, we believe the capital market
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structure of mortgage lenders does not significantly affect the result of our
analysis.
Nevertheless, given that there is an opportunity for efficiency gain in
helping sluggish refinancers, we do not completely rule out the possibility
that a well-established, reputable, and long-term-oriented company with
other profit sources may jump in and help consumers refinance more
efficiently. Our main point is only that the market forces currently existing
among brokers and lenders seem insufficient to educate consumers or
otherwise lift obfuscation to stimulate efficient refinancing.
On a broader note, our contention is that product-choice mistakes and
failure-to-switch mistakes largely share the same set of underlying causes.
As we have seen, these include collective action problems, imperfect
competition due to information costs, lack of conditions in the market for
full information disclosure, and lack of incentives for the market
participants to educate consumers optimally. Taken together, all of these
conditions allow the market to remain sufficiently obfuscated for
unsophisticated consumers. In this sense, we view product-choice mistakes
and failure-to-switch mistakes as causally equivalent—as different
manifestations of the same set of underlying market failures.
C.

REGULATORY OBJECTIVES AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

The foregoing discussions sought to rationalize failure-to-switch
mistakes among consumers lacking financial sophistication, and explored
possible reasons why the market left to its own may not fix this problem.
As it turns out, product-choice mistakes and failure-to-switch mistakes are
not only causally analogous, but also consequentially analogous: with both
types of mistakes, market obfuscation allows lenders to extract greater
interest costs from unsophisticated consumers than they are able to
internalize.
As a general matter, when a market is characterized by search-andswitch costs for consumers, firms are able to earn profits even under
competition. This is because a consumer seeking to switch out of a
particular product—either for its low quality or a high price—must incur a
search-and-switch cost before he can consume a different good. It is also
true that where consumers are not fully rational, the consumer credit
industry may consistently earn rents despite competition.61 Depending on
the extent to which competition can successfully eradicate lender surplus,
the overall effect of persistence of either type of mistake is some
61. See, e.g., Ausubel, supra note 42, 56–64 (demonstrating empirically that the credit
card industry earns supracompetitive profits compared to other banking activities, despite
the industry’s low concentration and low barrier to entry).
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combination of rent extraction and a cross-subsidization of sophisticated
consumers by unsophisticated consumers.
This brings us to ask whether there are normative policy implications
for consumers’ failure-to-switch mistakes. The Bureau’s stated central
mission on its website is “to make markets for consumer financial products
and services work for Americans—whether they are applying for a
mortgage, choosing among credit cards, or using any number of other
consumer financial products.”62 According to the statute, Congress charged
the Bureau with ensuring that: (i) all consumers have access to markets for
consumer financial products and services; and (ii) markets for consumer
financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive. One
can certainly advance an argument that market obfuscation leading to
cross-subsidization violates the condition that these markets should be
“fair” and “transparent.” To this extent, measures to help unsophisticated
consumers will promote distributional equity. One could also argue—
somewhat agnostically—that given that Congress has already chosen to
intervene to correct product-choice mistakes, any rationale for such
intervention will likewise carry over to failure-to-switch mistakes as well.
Economists, however, generally prefer to see policy objectives in
terms of increasing society’s total wealth. This poses a threshold challenge
for consumer financial protection regulation because measures to help
consumers refinance more efficiently—along with other measures of
consumer financial protection—largely facilitate transfers. The direct
effect is a transfer from lenders to unsophisticated consumers. The failureto-switch problem deals with an existing payment obligation that will
continue to provide interest costs to lenders. An efficient switch would
allow the consumer to reduce interest payments and thereby maintain a
greater wealth. In the cumulative, the amount saved by consumers through
refinancing will generally equal the foregone interest collected by the
incumbent lender minus the interest costs collected by the new lender and
other transaction costs. Put differently, the amount saved by consumers as
a group will generally equal the amount lost by lenders as a group minus
other transaction costs. As an indirect effect, these measures will end up
mitigating the existing cross-subsidization under competition. This
indicates a de facto transfer from sophisticated consumers to
unsophisticated consumers. But transfers do not directly increase society’s
overall wealth. Furthermore, because there are transaction costs associated
with more frequent refinancing, there can be substantial economic costs
involved in effecting such transfers—some of which may not otherwise

62. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Learn About the Bureau, CFPB (Dec. 6,
2001), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/.
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generate additional value for consumers or lenders.
For these reasons, most of the typical justifications for government
intervention in this area have appealed to arguments based on negative
externalities of having households holding high-level debts as economic
costs to society.63 Households holding high-level debts are more likely to
default, to file for bankruptcy, and to result in foreclosure of their
properties. Bankruptcy filings and foreclosures use up valuable social
resources. Foreclosures tend to bring down prices of neighboring houses.
There are also adverse consequences to the economy at large in terms of
unemployment rates and reduced consumption levels.64 Indeed, in the most
recent financial crisis, the private debt crisis expanded into a public debt
crisis.
Finally, some have argued that the harm from consumer
indebtedness extends beyond monetary outcomes. One study documents
causal effects between high debt levels and deterioration of physical and
mental health of the debtors.65 It is at least plausible that, taking all these
factors into consideration, these economic costs can exceed the transaction
costs involved in facilitating individual refinancing. To this extent, more
efficient refinancing may be justified on the grounds of reduced default
risks and other associated externalities.
There are also more nuanced arguments appealing to improved
allocative efficiency. In the case of consumer credit market, there are
potentially two sources of deadweight costs: among those who participate
in the market and among those who choose not to do so. Consider first
product-choice mistakes. These mistakes introduce a deadweight loss as a
result of consumers who take out mortgages without fully internalizing all
the hidden, add-on costs of borrowing: the effective demand curve is
therefore shifted out as compared to what the true demand curve would be
under perfect information.
63. For more types of economic costs arising from consumer credit, see Bar-Gill &
Warren, supra note 7, at 56–64 (noting monetary costs associated with consumers’ failure to
switch cards after introductory periods, the negative economic effects of consumers
choosing plans not necessary in their best financial interest, and the impediment consumer
mistakes pose to subprime market competition); see also Campbell, Consumer Financial
Protection, supra note 1, at 96 (discussing four rationales for government policy in
consumer financial protection).
64. Mian & Sufi argue that household debt is one of the principal causes of the financial
crisis and the ensuing recession. Mian & Sufi, supra note 2, at 1462–63. In particular, they
find that household leverage growth and credit card borrowing prior to the crisis is related to
subsequent adverse changes in household defaults, unemployment, and consumption within
U.S. counties. Id. at 1492.
65. Matthias Keese & Hendrik Schmitz, Broke, Ill, and Obese: The Effect of Household
Debt on Health (Ruhr Econ. Paper No. 234, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1735420 (documenting that household debt causally
deteriorates physical and mental health).
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A parallel argument can apply to failure-to-switch mistakes. These
mistakes would introduce a deadweight loss if sluggish refinancers could
not properly anticipate their likely failure-to-switch mistakes in the future,
and thus they do not properly price their future difficulty of refinancing in
choosing among various mortgage products.
A weak form of testing this hypothesis may be to compare the
different patterns of mortgage choices between sophisticated households
and unsophisticated households. If we assume there is no systematic
difference in the risk-preferences between sophisticated and
unsophisticated households, then unsophisticated households should be
marginally more willing to choose ARMs rather than FRMs.66 This is
because, all else equal, the option to actively refinance on the borrower’s
own initiative should not be as valuable to unsophisticated households, as it
is to sophisticated households. Noticing that recent evidence, by contrast,
shows that ARMs were favored by better-educated households, Campbell
concludes that “it does not seem that households that lack the knowledge to
refinance FRMs substitute away from these mortgage contracts in a way
that would be analogous to nonparticipation as a response to lack of
knowledge about the stock market.”67 In this sense, since unsophisticated
households are not properly pricing the difficulty of refinancing in their
initial mortgage product decisions, stimulating more efficient refinancing
may reduce the deadweight loss in the original financing product market,
and in turn, the spread between ARM rates and FRM rates may more
accurately reflect the substitution effects between the two.
There is another potential source of allocative inefficiency from those
who, as a result of market obfuscation, may refuse to participate in the
financial market altogether.68 To be sure, this is a different group of
consumers than the ones subject to product-choice mistakes and failure-toswitch mistakes. This Article has focused on the segment of consumers
who are initially exogenously motivated to take out mortgages but then
decide not to participate in the financial market due to market obfuscation.
But there may be a more risk-averse segment among unsophisticated
consumers who do not trust the financial market or themselves to
efficiently manage their mortgages. They may choose to abstain from
purchasing mortgage products altogether. To the extent that market
transparency is capable of ameliorating both product-choice mistakes and
failure-to-switch mistakes, it can increase the demand from these
consumers and result in additional gains in efficiency.
66. Campbell, Household Finance, supra note 13, at 1585.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Campbell, Consumer Financial Protection, supra note 1, at 93 (“[L]ack of
financial market participation can be a serious mistake . . . .”).
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What will then be the likely economic effects of facilitating more
efficient refinancing? Here again, the economic effects are expected to be
similar in nature to those of reducing product-choice mistakes. As
discussed above, measures to correct both types of mistakes have the direct
effect of reducing profitable, rent-extracting opportunities for lenders and
also of mitigating cross-subsidization. In the case of product-choice
mistakes, corrective measures will lead to a reduce likelihood that
unsophisticated consumers will choose dangerous products that are more
profitable to lenders; in the case of failure-to-switch mistakes, corrective
measures will lead to profit streams from sustained interest payments being
reduced. To the extent that corrective measures for either type of mistake
will mitigate the effect of cross-subsidization, they are expected to lead to
some welfare loss for currently sophisticated consumers. No doubt our
analogy does break down at some point: to the extent that transaction costs,
such as appraisal fees, are involved in mortgage refinancing, more efficient
refinancing activities impose a cost on society which is not germane to
efficient product-choice decisions.
The difficult part is predicting how lenders may respond once a
significant fraction of sluggish refinancers begin switching efficiently.
Here we only offer speculative discussions.
If the government can encourage more efficient refinancing when the
rates decline, lenders will face a higher prepayment risk. They may
respond by raising interest rates, charging higher fees, or more vigorously
enforcing prepayment penalty clauses to make up for the lost profit
opportunities. Initially, raising interest rates across the board is the most
natural response—and this is likely given that the rate has been at an alltime low recently. But at some point, lenders may not find it profitable to
raise interest rates due to a potential adverse selection problem. Stiglitz
and Weiss have argued that higher interest rates may have a sorting effect
of attracting only risky borrowers.69 Martin and Smyth similarly note that
“[h]igh interest rates may adversely affect the pool of potential borrowers
from which the bank must choose its loan portfolio and they may have
undesirable incentive effects on the borrower’s post-contractual
behavior.”70 As long as lenders cannot perfectly screen borrower types,
lenders will face the adverse selection problem in raising interest rates. In
addition, even without adverse selection, higher interest rates can
themselves be the cause of higher default risks by borrowers.
69. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information, 71 AMER. ECON. REV. 393, 408 (1981).
70. Robert E. Martin & David J. Smyth, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Effects in
the Mortgage Market: An Empirical Analysis, 57 S. ECON. J. 1071, 1072 (1991). Martin and
Smyth went on to predict the critical rate to be around 11 percent.
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Eventually, lenders may have to respond by raising upfront lender fees
or increasing other types of fees, such as late payment penalties. Because
lender fees are not “credit-sensitive portions of prices,”71 raising lender fees
will not effect in any adverse selection. The overall effect will be a more
equitable distribution of the total cost of borrowing among sophisticated
and unsophisticated consumers.
Finally, we also mention a potential unintended consequence of
promoting market transparency and assisting unsophisticated households.
Although our discussion thus far has assumed that consumers come in
binary types—either sophisticated or unsophisticated—in reality,
consumers come with a spectrum of sophistication. It may not be possible,
or even cost-effective, to offer a level of transparency that can place all
consumers on a level playing field. At a theoretical level, there is concern
that a regulatory effort to promote market transparency may actually
exacerbate the cross-subsidization effect. This may be the case if the
market becomes only so transparent as to reach only a fraction of the
currently-unsophisticated consumers and otherwise fails to be equally
transparent for all consumers. This problem is not limited to the market for
consumer credit; the same concern can be raised in securities regulation
and any other market where consumer sophistication or informedness is a
factor. Ultimately, whether regulation can mitigate or exacerbate crosssubsidization is an empirical question, and one germane to the particular
design of each regulatory proposal. Nevertheless, we simply note that the
regulator need remain mindful of this possible outcome.
D.

Ex Ante Efficiency versus Ex Post Welfare

We next ask whether helping consumers improve their ex post welfare
can have an adverse effect on ex ante efficiency. The law-and-economics
literature on contracts is rife with theoretical tradeoffs between ex ante
efficiency and ex post welfare:72 Renegotiation increases ex post welfare
but its possibility diminishes incentives to make proper ex ante
investments; commitment devices encourage efficient ex ante investments
but restrict mutually welfare-enhancing negotiation after the fact.
Likewise, could mitigating the failure-to-switch problem discourage
consumers from properly investing into choosing the suitable credit product
initially—thereby reducing ex ante efficiency? Theoretically, yes. All else

71. Ausubel, supra note 42, at 71.
72. E.g., Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56
ECONOMETRICA 755, 775 (1988) (identifying the connection between ex ante incomplete
contracts and ex post revisions of terms).
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equal, consumers spend more time purchasing non-refundable products
than refundable ones.
But we mention several mitigating factors in this market. First, it is
always possible that the market conditions may never improve during the
term of the loan—meaning there is no opportunity to make use of welfareimproving refinancing and the refund option may never be exercised.
Second and more importantly, some, if not all, of the ex ante effort is
transferable for ex post welfare improvement: the consumer expecting to
efficiently switch later still benefits from early investment because he will
still need to understand how certain credit terms apply when they decide to
switch. Therefore, researching into the terms of various products the first
time will assist him later. Since a methodology-based refinancing we
proposed in this Article capitalizes on the consumer’s earlier investment to
save his future information cost, there is likely to be little contravening
effect. Third, empirical evidence indicates that those most likely to fail to
switch are those most likely to not properly invest in—or make initial
mistakes in—the initial financing decisions.
This indicates that,
empirically speaking, those who are already skilled at refinancing will
stand to gain relatively little from regulation, and thus will not be seriously
discouraged by ex ante investment; conversely, those who stand to gain the
most from regulation are already investing suboptimally in choosing the
right mortgage products. For these reasons, we do not believe the
government’s effort to address the failure-to-switch problem will
significantly undermine ex ante efficiency.
III. PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING FAILURE-TO-SWITCH MISTAKES
Government-initiated solutions to stimulate efficient refinancing
among consumers can come in varying degrees of intrusiveness. As
mentioned above, to the extent that status quo bias or consumer inertia can
account for some of the sluggishness of refinancing, we do believe
ultimately some type of automation is desirable. For this reason, some
scholars, such as Nalebuff and Ayres73 and Campbell,74 have been arguing
for automatic refinancing mortgage products whose rates can only adjust
downward, but very few lenders have shown interest in marketing such
products, and only at an interest rate above the prevailing fixed rate.75
73. BARRY NALEBUFF & IAN AYRES, WHY NOT?: HOW TO USE EVERYDAY INGENUITY TO
SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG AND SMALL (2006).
74. See, e.g., Campbell, Household Finance, supra note 13, at 1580 (analyzing lowincome and minority mortgage borrowers’ default and prepayment habits, and the
consequences thereof on mortgage pricing).
75. Broderick Perkins, Great Idea: The Automatic Rate Reduction Loan, REALITYTIMES
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Congress can choose to mandate all lenders to offer such products as the
default mortgage products, although it will be a difficult proposal from a
political perspective. But even if this option was politically viable, it is not
clear that this solution is sufficiently general. Borrowers may want to
hedge against a number of different risks in addition to the inflation risk—
for example, the credit spread risk. Congress can also legislate to reduce
any redundant costs involved in refinancing. Nelson and Whitman, for
example, argue that under the proper use of the doctrine of equitable
mortgage subrogation from THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
MORTGAGES, lenders should be able to elect to forego their current
requirement of reissuing title insurance.76 The government may also
choose to selectively subsidize refinancing costs for a certain group of
borrowers, although this may raise a moral hazard problem.
We do not question the usefulness or desirability of these proposals—
in fact, we support them. At the same time, we also think we might be
getting ahead of ourselves in these discussions, without trying more modest
and obvious regulatory solutions that can address at least a part of the noted
problem. In this section, we discuss an initial regulatory option that is less
intrusive and more intuitive. The approach we suggest is also consistent
with the government’s approach to mandating more effective disclosure,
and also with the Bureau duty to promote “fair, transparent, and
competitive” mortgage markets. The main idea is that if borrowers fail to
switch in part due to the lack of credible mechanism of communication and
the lack of incentives for lenders or brokers to reveal potentially useful
information, it may be sensible to promote (i) information-de-shrouding in
the market to educate consumers, (ii) information-certification to instill
consumers with a sense of trust, (iii) a clear calculation of potential longterm costs and benefits of switching so as to de-bias the consumers of their
lack of self-awareness, and (iv) a reduction of information cost for
consumers.

(May 7, 1999), http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/19990507_autorefi.htm; Automatic Rate Cut
Refinancing, DEBTHELP.COM (Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.debthelp.com/kc/54-automaticrate-cut-refinancing.html.
76. See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Adopting Restatement Mortgage
Subrogation Principles: Saving Billions of Dollars for Refinancing Homeowners, 2006
B.Y.U. L. REV. 305 (2006) (discussing how lenders may elect to forego their current
requirement of reissuing title insurance under the proper use of the doctrine of equitable
mortgage subrogation from THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES).
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Government-Certified Product-Comparison Methodology

The Bureau should consider establishing, certifying, and popularizing
a general product-comparison methodology and a catchy concept—a
common language of sorts—which can be used to empower consumers in
assessing whether a new product is welfare-improving as compared to the
existing product under various future states. Just as effective disclosure
regulation is intended to empower consumers to choose suitable credit
products by dictating the terms and the manner of disclosure, an effective
and trusted comparison methodology and concept can empower consumers
to make right comparisons and switch their products in certain instances,
resulting in guaranteed net benefits.
Take Annual Percent Rate (“APR”), for example. There is nothing
special or overly technical about this concept, and yet APR calculation is
governed by the Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”), which dictates what costs
must be included in calculating APR. This allows borrowers to compare
various mortgage products. Otherwise, lenders could use various different
concepts of interest rates to market their products: simple monthly, simple
annual, compound monthly, compound annually, annual rate in advance,
etc. TILA created the concept of APR to “allow consumers to make an
‘apples to apples’ comparison . . . using a consistent formulation that
lenders were required to use.”77 APR thus provides a simple language
borrowers can use to inquire about the effective interest rate. In theory,
lenders are not permitted to use APR to mean anything other than how
TILA specifies it to be.
However, in practice, APR has several failings. First, not everyone
understands the concept of APR as distinct from interest rate.78 Second,
even with the effort of regulation, there still remain discrepancies in which
fixed costs get included in the APR.79 Third, mortgage APRs do not
account for consumers’ tax deductions, and thus are incomplete insofar as
capturing the full financial effect of borrowing. Fourth, APR can be
misleading because it assumes the underlying loan to run its full-term.
77. Jerry Wegman, A Failure of Credit Regulation: The Case of NCAS of Delaware, 13
PROC. ACAD. LEGAL ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 22, 23 (2009).
78. Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases and
Payday Borrowing, at 5 (Chi. Booth Research Paper, Working Paper No. 10–01, 2009),
available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/marianne.bertrand/research/PayField091008.pdf
(stating that “[b]orrowers could be financially unsophisticated such that they do not
understand why or how an APR should matter”).
79. See, e.g., Annual Percent Rate, WIKIPEDIA.ORG (Oct. 21, 2011, 09:10 AM),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annual_percentage_rate (discussing how Truth-in-Lending Act
leaves discretion as to whether mortgage lenders need to include certain fixed costs in
calculating APR).
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McClatchey and de la Torre80 and Buch et al.81 argue therefore that the
APR calculation should be modified to account for each consumer’s
specific time horizon. Fifth, borrowers may not react sensitively to the
disclosure of APR because it carries little emotional salience as an
economic cost.82 On the other hand, the authors did find that presenting the
added-up dollar-cost of the loan did have an effect on borrowers’ tendency
to take out loans.83 Sixth, while APRs may facilitate a comparison among
existing products, they do not present an obvious mechanism for comparing
the existing loan obligation against the new product and as such may be
useless in stimulating refinancing.
The current disclosure requirement for refinancing includes a number
of items about the new loan, but very little is required in terms of helping
consumers compare a new loan to their existing loan obligations. Online
loan calculators, which seek to assist consumers in this particular aspect,
are not standardized and they vary in terms of the factors they include in
their output. As such, a consumer may obtain multiple different results
depending on the calculator she happens to come across.
The Bureau should test various methodologies and see which concepts
tend to be most salient and useful for consumers. Here, we list a few
preliminary concepts that may be useful to consumers in deciding whether
to refinance:


Year-by-Year Cumulative Net Out-of-Pocket Expense Savings
(“n-year CNOPES”). This figure would indicate the dollar
value of the amount of money the borrower will end up saving
over the course of n years under the assumption of full and
timely payments. This should include interest costs minus tax
deduction, plus other costs involved refinancing, but would not
include payments towards the principal. For a thirty-year fixed
rate mortgage, a thirty-year CNOPES would essentially
compare the total interest costs plus closing costs against the
remaining interest costs under the existing obligation. If
refinancing entails a substantial closing cost, then one-year
CNOPES and two-year CNOPES may actually be negative.

80. Christine McClatchey & Cris de la Torre, Comparing Fixed-Rate Mortgage Loans
via the APR: Cautions and Caveats (Working Paper, 2011), available at http://www.mcb.
unco.edu/Faculty/workingPapers/JFSP%20submission%20_2_.pdf.
81. Joshua Buch et al., The Usefulness of the APR for Mortgage Marketing in the USA
and the UK, 20 INT’L J. BANK MARKETING 76, 83–84 (2002).
82. Bertrand & Morse, supra note 76, at 5–9.
83. Id.
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Comparative Risk Factors (“CR Factors”). This would be a
description of future states under which the borrower would be
worse off than under his current existing obligation. This may
be relevant if the new loan includes a prepayment penalty
clause, which either did not exist in the original loan or existed
in a smaller amount or phased out much earlier. If the new
loan has a higher late payment penalty, then this factor would
also be highlighted. If the borrower is going from an FRM to
an ARM, then the future state where interest rate spikes up
would also be explained. If the new loan entails a substantial
closing cost, then this would also include a situation where the
borrower has to move or otherwise prepay earlier than can reap
net savings. Comparison would be particularly easy for
consumers in cases where there are no future states under
which the borrower may be worse off under the new loan than
under the existing loan—such as a no-closing cost loan with a
reduced rate, which otherwise matches all other terms of the
existing loan.

In any financial transaction, the party entering it should care about (i)
expected returns and (ii) accompanying risks. The concepts listed above
are intended to capture those two factors transparently. In addition,
consumers typically want to know how long they must stay in their current
homes to come out even, if they were to refinance. The first concept
captures this information as well.
Just like APR, there is nothing technical about these concepts, and one
would hope that consumers are already taking these concepts into account
in choosing to refinance. Nevertheless, there will be a benefit for the
Bureau to regulate these concepts in a uniform, consistent, and intuitive
manner and popularize them so as to facilitate easy communication with
lenders. Once these concepts become popularized, consumers may start
demanding such information from lenders or brokers.
Borrowers can use these concepts to protect themselves and to save on
information costs. A broker approaches him with a product, and a
borrower may ask for a table of CNOPES and comparative risk factors.
Encouraging borrowers to use a methodology-based refinancing strategy as
the default refinancing option will likely protect borrowers and also allow
them to not worry about potential downside risks. Because the borrower is
more likely to have invested in his original product and be familiar with the
terms, he can benefit from the reduced cost of not having to worry about
hidden information. Likewise, the Bureau can mandate all brokers
providing refinancing options to display the information comparing the two
products under this methodology, which will tend to highlight the precise
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terms that render the new mortgage product to be not directly comparable
to the existing one.
B.

Applications

We believe the approach we recommend will indeed empower
consumers and motivate them to search and switch more efficiently,
knowing that information can be demanded and presented in a relatively
simple format. But this may not be enough to encourage all borrowers to
seek timely refinancing. There are further applications that can come
about—either by means of further regulation or as a result of market
forces—once we have those concepts standardized.
For example, frequently, a consumer will qualify for a lower interest
rate mortgage offered by the incumbent lender. The lender may recognize
this but rationally abstain from sharing this information. The burden for
seeking out this opportunity thus lies with the consumer. One benefit of
refinancing with the incumbent lender is that the lender already has a great
deal of information about the consumer and the property, and therefore,
there may be a substantial saving in the transaction costs. To this extent, a
simple disclosure regulation may alleviate this problem and reduce the
burden on the consumers of constantly inquiring the bank. If it is within
the scope of the Bureau’s authority, it can consider mandating lenders to
send out periodic mailing to their consumers, letting them know of the best
available products they are currently offering and how they compare to the
borrower’s existing mortgage obligation under the product-comparison
methodology. The lender may choose to market new products of its own in
various manners. The difference is that the notice sent out according to the
disclosure regulation must be limited to providing information about the
best available products that guarantee savings.
There may be a number of market-based solutions, which can further
mitigate the problem of consumer inertia. For example, an agent or a
commercial vendor may be given a limited power-of-attorney of
refinancing whereby he can only refinance to mortgages that meet the
welfare-improving standard the borrower specifies. A mortgage registry
may facilitate refinancing auctions, whereby borrowers can upload their
information, competing lenders can bid, and the lender offering the best
term can take away the mortgage contract for a specified period. If
effective, this registry can also erode the monopolistic informational
advantage the incumbent lender has over other lenders. This set-up also
reduces consumers’ search costs because lenders have an incentive to
compete over even obscure terms that increase the risk associated with the
mortgage but that the consumers may not have noticed initially. The
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market may even evolve towards a condition where professional liability
managers can make refinancing decisions for consumers in return for a
commission based on a fraction of CNOPES. Having liability managers
make refinancing decisions can also be beneficial to the extent that they
may be more knowledgeable about making optimal refinancing decisions—
including the time value of waiting—rather than simply extracting the
amount of surplus available at any given time.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we analyzed consumers’ failure-to-switch mistakes in
the mortgage market—a particular class of consumer mistakes that has not
received much attention from regulators or policymakers. Failure-toswitch mistakes share causal and consequential similarities with productchoice mistakes.
In fact, we believe they are simply different
manifestations of the same type of market failures that permit market
obfuscation. By applying the economic theory of product-choice mistakes,
we provided a framework for understanding why failure-to-switch mistakes
persist among unsophisticated borrowers and why the market is unlikely to
provide the socially optimal level of transparency to promote efficient
refinancing.
Given the government’s policy decision to address product-choice
mistakes, we believe there is little reason for it to stay away from
addressing failure-to-switch mistakes. We emphasize the information
certification role the Bureau can play by establishing and popularizing
concepts and methodologies that can reduce the information cost of search
and switching. If successful, these measures can reduce the information
rent lenders currently collect, mitigate the potential cross-subsidization of
sophisticated consumers by naïve consumers, reduce negative externalities
associated with high household debt levels, and reduce deadweight losses
that arise from market obfuscation.
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APPENDIX
Proposition 1 (Failure-to-Switch Mistakes). If lenders cannot
credibly convey the true interest rate, there is a uniformlydistributed obfuscation in the market. The consumer accordingly
must incur a search cost to understand the terms of the product,
which is strictly convex on the level of obfuscation. Sluggish
refinancing behaviors will then appear in the form of consumers’
failures to make timely refinancing switches. In addition, as
empirically observed, the lag will increase in the level of
obfuscation and the personal search cost coefficient, and will
decrease in the principal remaining.
Proof. Suppose the consumer is currently paying a mortgage whose
interest rate is r1, with the remaining principle p1. Let c1 be the net present
interest cost over the remainder term (including tax deduction and
insurance fee). Let
be the net present interest cost (minus
tax deduction and other miscellaneous costs) of a new mortgage with
effective interest rate r and principle p, where T is the term of the loan. Let
cf be the closing cost that must be incurred upon refinancing. (cf may be
zero for no-closing cost refinancing). Suppose the consumer demands at
least a saving of F through refinancing. If r* < r1 is the cutoff interest rate
optimal for refinancing, we need
+ cf c1 – F. (This model does
not incorporate the option-value of waiting.)
The consumer observes a signal from lenders. Given , the actual
effective interest rate of the product is uniformly distributed between
ε

. Therefore,
. is the level of obfuscation: the
signal is perfect when
, but is otherwise imperfect. The consumer is
aware of and must incur a search cost of
to fully verify the
offer, where
. As mentioned in the text, this functional form of the
search cost is chosen to satisfy three conditions: the search cost is (i) zero
when
, (ii) increasing in , and (iii) strictly convex in the level of
obfuscation.
From the perspective of the social planner, he would want the
consumer to switch when the expected interest rate is less than or equal to
r*. Since
, we want the consumer to switch to a product
when the signal is
or less. Therefore, let
be
the social planner’s signal choice.
But the consumer will search into the new product only if the
expected benefit of the search is greater than the search cost. Upon
observing , the search may turn into the following benefit:
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Benefit from searching =
– –
Therefore, the cutoff value for that prompts the consumer to search
is determined by the following condition:
where
if

Within
, the integral leads to the following search
condition: Search if and only if

Solving this inequality, we get the following cutoff condition: search
if and only if

The consumer’s private signal threshold
is thus lower than
, the social planner’s threshold for having consumers switch, as long
as there is a positive amount obfuscation,
. This means that on
average the consumer will wait until the interest rate declines further.
Let the following denote the lag between the socially desirable
refinancing cutoff and the privately desirable refinancing cutoff, or the
premium demanded by unsophisticated borrowers before searching:

Notice that
increases in
and K, and decreases in
.
Therefore, the nosier the signal, the higher the search cost, thus the more
likely the consumer will wait until a lower signal to search; the higher the
remaining principal, the more likely the consumer will search sooner
(comparatively).
Implicit in our assumption is that consumers are boundedly rational.
If consumers were perfectly rational, they could learn eventually that their
individually rational response to market obfuscation would result in their
failure to make timely switches. In that case, they could update their
strategies by searching earlier than they may be motivated. Q.E.D.
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In the following Proposition, we model a competition between two
mortgage lenders in an infinitely repeated game and prove the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 (Lender Collusion). Suppose the following three
conditions hold: (i) lenders do not discount the future too much,
(ii) lenders expect interest rates will continue to decline, and (iii)
there is a positive fraction of population that is ignorant of
interest rate changes, or otherwise insensitive to interest rate
changes, unless specially made aware of those changes (as in
Proposition 1). Then a Nash equilibrium exists in an infinitely
repeated game under which lenders will continue to compete for
new borrowers, but will not make special effort—even if it’s
costless—to entice their competitors’ existing borrowers by
undercutting the interest rates.
Proof. Suppose the economy comes with two lenders, A and B. There
is a continuum of population of size 1, of which
(0,1) is the fraction
keenly aware of each period’s effective interest rate and always refinances
whenever a lower rate comes along. They can refinance costlessly, but the
result is stronger if we assume costly refinancing. By contrast, 1 –
remains ignorant of interest rate changes unless specifically approached by
a better offer.
In each period k, the interest rate ik
(0,1) is announced by the
government. k (0,1) is the fraction of the population come to lenders A
and B to seek financing. A and B compete for borrowers by simultaneously
announcing the interest rate jAk and jBk. At equilibrium, jAk = jBk = ik for
every period k. A and B evenly split the consumers, and k begin paying
interest rate ik from period k until k + T. T is the term of the loan and can
be thought of as 360 months, for example. ραk of them are rate sensitive,
and
k is ignorant and continue to pay ik for T terms, unless a
lender makes special effort to reach them through advertisement. Because
lenders can refinance costlessly, when the interest rate declines, they earn
positive profit from
of the borrowers who do not refinance;
meanwhile, lenders earn zero profit from of them.
For each period, A and B both have two potential strategies: advertise
or not advertise. Advertisement is costless. If neither advertises, then the
two lenders continue to split the borrowers and hold onto their incumbent
borrowers who do not refinance. Therefore, in period k, each earns the
following profit:

Where f = min{1, k – T + 1}. This is an infinitely repeated game between
A and B. Suppose in one period k, A decides to advertise, while B does not.
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In that case, A can approach each of
k-T+1 ,. . .,
k and
slightly undercut the interest rate each group are paying, in case they are
paying above ik. Then in this period, A steals away additional
τ
from B for this period. If they both advertise, then they again engage in
Bertrand competition for each of
ρ α1 ,. . .,
ρ αk, and thus
each party ends up losing
τ
since those borrowers will be offered the current best interest rate, ik.
Therefore, the normal form of the period k stage game is as follows:
B
Advertise
Not Advertise
A
Advertise
Not Advertise
In terms of the stage game, (Advertise, Advertise) is the unique Nash
equilibrium. However, in the infinitely repeated game, this does not
necessarily hold. Suppose both A and B play according to the following
strategy: (Not Advertise each period until the opponent chooses Advertise,
after which, always Advertise). In this case, if either player advertises, then
both players earn zero profits for the remainder of the game. Therefore, if
A is thinking about advertising in period k, it will compare the additional
profit it reaps through advertising against all future profits it will forego,
which is

A will not advertise, so long as τ

σ , or

Notice first that this condition is never satisfied if = 0, meaning
there has to be borrowers who are unaware of interest rate changes, or are
otherwise insensitive to interest rate changes. If ik is continually
decreasing, then we can assume the minimum interest rate is always the
latest, and the above inequality can be rewritten as
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The first-term of the right hand side is

So
Since can be assumed to be arbitrarily close to 1, we must
have
. In other words, the condition for perpetually not advertising
is established. Q.E.D.

